Explaining the Effects of Political Islam and Preacher toward Prabowo’s Electoral Dominance: Evidence from Pekanbaru and Kampar by Saputra, Andhik Beni et al.
Explaining the Effects of Political 
Islam and Preacher toward Prabowo’s 
Electoral Dominance: Evidence 
from Pekanbaru and Kampar
A N D H I K  B E N I  S A P U T R A *
Department of Government, Abdurrab University
Jl. Riau Ujung No. 73 Pekanbaru, Riau, 28291
Indonesia
A Z H A R I  S E T I A W A N * *
Department of International Relations, Abdurrab University
Jl. Riau Ujung No. 73 Pekanbaru, Riau, 28291
Indonesia
H E S T I  H E R P I N A * * *
Department of Government, Abdurrab University




Sosok ulama di Indonesia memiliki peran krusial tidak hanya dalam urusan agama 
tetapi juga pada persoalan sosial politik. Literatur terkait perilaku pemilih di berbagai 
negara menunjukkan bahwa pemuka agama memiliki peran besar dalam memengaruhi 
orientasi dan perilaku politik dari para pengikutnya. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk meng-
kaji pengaruh Ustadz Abdul Somad (UAS) terhadap peningkatan signifikan perolehan 
suara Prabowo pada Pilpres 2019 di Provinsi Riau. Meskipun secara nasional perolehan 
suara Prabowo kalah dari Jokowi dengan margin yang besar, Prabowo berhasil mem-
peroleh kemenangan di 13 dari 34 provinsi, salah satunya adalah Riau. Kami berasumsi 
bahwa Prabowo memperoleh keunggulan elektoral atas Jokowi di Provinsi Riau kare-
na faktor dukungan UAS yang berpengaruh signifikan terhadap peningkatan tajam 
suaranya dibandingkan dengan Pemilu 2014. Tulisan ini menggunakan pendekatan 
kuantitatif untuk menguji kecenderungan ini. Data dalam penelitian ini bersumber 
dari survei yang difokuskan pada dua daerah dengan penduduk terpadat di Riau, yaitu 
Pekanbaru dan Kabupaten Kampar. Studi ini mengonfirmasi bahwa UAS memberikan 
efek signifikan terhadap orientasi dan perilaku pemilih Muslim untuk memilih Prabo-
wo pada pemilihan presiden terakhir. Temuan lainnya juga sejalan dengan beberapa 
penelitian terdahulu yang menunjukkan besarnya pengaruh agama, khususnya Islam, 
sebagai faktor penting yang mendorong perilaku politik umat Islam. Kontribusi dari 
studi ini adalah untuk menambah khazanah literatur tentang perilaku pemilih pada 
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konteks politik Indonesia dengan menguji pengaruh dukungan politik dari sosok ulama 
populer—UAS—terhadap distribusi perolehan suara kandidat presiden pada kontestasi 
pemilihan presiden pada tahun 2019. Hal ini semakin diperkuat dengan kehadiran dan 
peran dari sosok ulama yang memberikan dukungan kepada masing-masing kandidat 
presiden pada kontetasi politik di 2019.
Kata kunci: UAS, Prabowo, perilaku pemilih, Pilpres 2019 
ABSTRACT
Ulama in Indonesia have critical roles not only in religious teachings but also in so-
cio-political affairs. The literature on voter behavior in many countries shows that 
religious leaders have critical roles in directing the political orientation and behavior 
of their followers. This article aims to examine the influence of Ustadz Abdul Somad 
(UAS) toward a significant increase of Prabowo’s vote share in the 2019 presidential 
election in Riau Province. Although Prabowo lost to Jokowi with a large margin in the 
last election, he was able to claim electoral victory in 13 out of 34 provinces—one of 
them is Riau. We assume that Prabowo gained the electoral advantage over his rival in 
Riau due to electoral support from UAS that ultimately gave significant effect toward a 
sharp increase for his votes compared to the 2014 election. We apply the quantitative 
method to examine the phenomenon. The data are mainly collected through a survey 
conducted in the two most populous regions in Riau—Pekanbaru and Kampar Regen-
cy. Our study confirms that UAS has a significant effect on Muslim voters’ orientation 
and behavior to vote for Prabowo in the last presidential election. Other findings in 
this study are also in line with previous studies suggesting a critical influence of reli-
gion, particularly Islam, in driving Muslim’s political behavior. The contribution of our 
study is to enrich the literature on voter behavior in Indonesian politics by examining 
the influence of political support from a popular preacher—UAS—on the distribution 
of electoral support for presidential candidates in the 2019 election. This is further 
strengthened by the presence and role of ulama figures who give their support to each 
presidential candidate in the political contestation in 2019.
Keywords: UAS, Prabowo, voting behavior, 2019 presidential election
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INTRODUCTION
The politicization of religious identity in the last election impacted not 
only Muslim voting behavior but also the rise of Islamic preachers in 
directing voters’ political preference. Since the presidential nomina-
tion, many preachers played active roles in directing political discourse 
for national leadership in the next future. For example, the National 
Movement to Guard Ulama’s Fatwa (Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa 
Ulama) held a meeting in July 2019 to decide ijtima’ ulama (consensus) 
on vice-presidential candidates for Prabowo. Although it was Jokowi 
who chose a figure of Islamic preacher, Ma’ruf Amin, as his running 
mate, both presidential candidates got political support from some com-
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ponents of Indonesian Muslim communities in the electoral contest 
(Fachrudin 2019; McBeth 2018; Slama 2019).
The electoral vote for Jokowi–Amin nationally reached 55.32%, while 
Prabowo–Sandi only gained 44.68% (Komisi Pemilihan Umum 2019). 
In Riau Province, Prabowo claimed electoral victory with 61.28% votes 
over 38.72% for Jokowi. There is a sharp difference in results between 
the 2019 election and the previous election in 2014. In 2014, although 
Prabowo also won in Riau, he only prevailed in two out of twelve dis-
tricts, Pekanbaru City and Kampar Regency, while in 2019, he domi-
nated and gained massive votes in all districts. Moreover, Jokowi lost a 
larger significant vote compared to the 2014 election, where he could 
competitively collect 49.88% in this province (Azanella 2019). With 
this huge gap in the electoral vote, a normative explanation for this 
cause was because of Sandiaga Uno, Prabowo’s running mate coming 
from this province. However, we try to find an alternative explanation 
by examining the influence of a popular preacher from this province, 
Ustadz Abdul Somad (UAS), towards the massive electoral support for 
Prabowo–Sandi in Riau. 
Our decision to make UAS the focus of this study is mainly based 
on the consideration that with the increasingly intense mobilization of 
Islam following the 2019 elections, a prominent and respected Islamic 
preacher has a more significant impact in driving Muslim’s political be-
havior rather than Sandiaga Uno, who was born and raised in Riau. Our 
view is also strengthened by the fact that UAS was named by GNPF as 
running mate for Prabowo in the 2019 presidential election because his 
popularity could give an electoral effect to Prabowo’s electability in the 
presidential election. Moreover, Hanum Rais initiated #SomadEffect 
hashtags in her social media to convince UAS that he was the right 
person for the next national leadership by becoming Prabowo’s run-
ning mate (Sutrisno 2018). Although he refused the offer to be a vice-
president candidate for Prabowo, it was known by the public that he 
gave his support to Prabowo’s candidacy for presidential office in 2019 
(Kholid 2019). Before the voting day, he and Prabowo were involved in 
direct conversations depicting UAS’s political endorsement for Prabowo, 
108 JURNAL POLITIK, VOL. 7, NO. 1, FEBRUARY 2021
where their meeting was aired publicly by a private television channel 
in Indonesia. Thus, a critical question arose here: Did UAS’s support 
to Prabowo–Sandi significantly increase their electoral support in—his 
home province—Riau?
As a part of an individual’s identity, religion has a significant influ-
ence on the political behavior of its followers in many parts of the world 
(Grewal et al. 2019; Grzymala-Busse 2012; Margolis 2017; Omelicheva 
and Ahmed 2018; Tessler 2010). The influence of religion on an in-
dividual’s political orientation is also moderated by the presence of 
religious leaders or clerics who give their electoral support for particular 
candidates and parties (Boussalis, Coan, and Holman 2020; Djupe and 
Gilbert 2002; Djupe and Smith 2019; Freedman 2020; Glazier 2018; 
McClendon and Riedl 2021; Smith 2019). In the Muslim world, ulama 
(preachers) as individuals who have the authority in the teachings of 
Islamic thoughts are certainly the influential figures among Muslims 
as the ummah (community of believers). However, discussions on ulama 
and politics in the Muslim countries or countries with large Muslim 
population are, to the best of our knowledge, taking place in the insti-
tutional framework concerning the interplays between ulama and the 
state (Hatina 2010; Mostarom 2014; Mouline 2014; Osman 2012; Pierret 
2013; Saat 2018; Saif 2020; Scott 2012; Zaman 2002).
In Indonesia, discourses between Islam and the state remain a criti-
cal factor in directing the country’s political narratives. In the field of 
political participation, Indonesian voters are commonly influenced by 
ideology and party affiliation (Fossati 2019; Liddle and Mujani 2007, 
2010), figures of popular politicians (Fossati and Mietzner 2019), criti-
cal evaluations on government performance (Mujani and Liddle 2015; 
Mujani, Liddle, and Ambardi 2018) and even distribution of material 
incentives (Muhtadi 2019). However, Islam also plays a crucial part in 
shaping Muslims’ political preferences and behavior (Bazzi, Koehler-
Derrick, and Marx 2020; Mujani 2019, 2020; Pepinsky, Liddle, and 
Mujani 2012; Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2018). Additionally, the 
political activism of preachers further impacts toward Muslim’s orienta-
tion in giving their electoral support (Winarni 2014). The study on the 
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political activism of ulama and its influence on Indonesian Muslim is 
predominantly centered on the state’s semi-institutional religious au-
thority represented by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian 
Ulama Council) and ulama having affiliation with Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU) and Muhammadiyah as the two largest mass-Islamic organiza-
tions in Indonesia (Fealy and Bush 2014; Ichwan 2005; Lindsey 2012; 
Kusmayadi, Agung, and Andrias 2016; Nashir et al. 2019; Nasir 2014; 
Saat 2016). Considering the strength of the socio-cultural base of the or-
ganizations, it is understandable if ulama from these organizations have 
a critical influence on Muslim communities. Besides, NU and Muham-
madiyah, in particular, have succeeded in establishing themselves in 
the structure of Indonesian society and penetrating Muslim life. Thus, 
the discussion on ulama and politics simply falls into the web of politi-
cal patronage and clientelistic networks (Hamid 2013; Machmudi 2014; 
Pribadi 2018). However, when it turns to an individual preacher with a 
weak socio-cultural base because social media facilitate his rise—UAS 
in this case, we know very little precisely how this figure could drive 
voter behavior in the electoral competition. Therefore, our study tries 
to fill this gap and contribute to the literature on voting behavior in 
Indonesian politics.
POLITICA L ISL A M, ELECTOR A L POLITICS 
A ND VOTER BEH AV IOR IN INDONESI A
Islam and politics have been interesting topics for debates by scholars 
in political studies. A central issue that emerges from this case is the 
nexus between Islam and politics, particularly  Islam’s influences toward 
political affairs and development in the Muslim world. Unlike secular-
ism which proposes the separation of religion and the state whereby 
the latter should remain neutral in public affairs, Islam embraces the 
notion of mutual relationships between religion and politics (Khatab 
and Bouma 2007). Secularism is perceived as an alien concept by most 
Muslim societies. A short explanation for this case is that historically, 
Muslim societies did not experience extremely conflicting conditions 
between the state and religion. The concept of secularism was actually 
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introduced by “colonial and imperial invaders and then kept alive by 
local elites who came to power after the post-colonial period” (Hashemi 
2013, 81). 
In the Muslim world, the emergence of political Islam is a response 
to “the perceived failure of secular ideologies of nationalism and so-
cialism to deliver on their promises of anti-imperialist prosperity” (Ak-
barzadeh 2012, 1). The term political Islam itself simply refers to “the 
attempts of Muslim individuals, groups and movement to reconstruct 
the political, economic, social and cultural basis of their society along 
Islamic lines” (Esposito and Shahin 2013, 1). Islamists believe that “Is-
lam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics 
and society should be regulated in contemporary Muslim worlds and 
how the idea should be implemented in some fashion” (Fuller and 
Lapp 2004, xi). In this sense, political Islam also involves “a form of 
instrumentalization of Islam by individuals groups and organizations 
that pursue political objectives and responds to contemporary’s societal 
challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on 
re-appropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradi-
tion” (Denoeux 2002, 61). In summary, political Islam tries to construct 
political systems in Muslim countries that align with the Islamic faith. 
It is because Islam, in Islamists’ point of view, is not only a religion but 
also the state (din wa daulah). They try to construct Muslim’s ideal 
society based on Islamic law (shari’ah) as Muslim’s guides in their lives 
as human beings and their spiritual relationship with God. Accord-
ingly, it is not surprising if Islamists sensibly seek the implementation of 
shari’ah as a legal system governing the society in their political agendas 
(Roose 2017). Thus, capturing state power emerges as a crucial event 
in Islamist’s political trajectory to make their visions come into reality. 
The use of Islamic identity in the struggle for political power often 
leads many political analysts to equate Islamism with violent movement. 
Nevertheless, a deeper examination of political Islam reveals that the 
existing Islamic movements around the world today are not a single en-
tity based on one political organization. Each Islamist movement has its 
own way of realizing its ultimate goals (March 2015). It would be a mis-
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leading assumption when perceiving Islamism as a violent character in 
nature. Ayoob (2009, 22) explains that “political Islam is not a monolith 
and Islamist movements in different countries pursue nation-specific 
agendas and strategies, despite a superficial similarity in their rhetoric”. 
In this sense, it is essential to critically see how political development 
emerged in most Muslim countries where Islamist movements have 
their original roots and are massively operated there. It informs us that 
it is a local context of Muslim states that have mainly influenced the 
characteristics and development of Islamist movements (Ayoob 2004). 
In its relations to the existing political structure in the Muslim 
world, Bokhari and Senzai (2013, 26–27) classify Islamists into three 
groups—“acceptors, propagandists, insurrectionists”. Acceptors refer to 
the groups that accept the existing political system of the nation-state 
where they operate and follow rules of the game to pursue their goals 
through peaceful means. On the contrary, propagandists reject the idea 
of a nation-state and democracy as its political system. This second 
group tries to influence public opinion to be in favor of their ideological 
stances. Furthermore, they search for support from the state’s security 
apparatus to restructure its current political system into a universal 
caliphate. Finally, insurrectionists emerge as the most extreme groups 
that refuse to acknowledge the state along with its societal order. Unlike 
other groups engaged in non-violence manners, insurrectionists launch 
armed struggles, which they called jihad, to replace the current system 
with their own ideological conceptions on the state and political order. 
Al-Qaeda and ISIS are good examples of the third group of Islamist 
movements.
Yet from North Africa to Southeast Asia, Islamist movements pursu-
ing their interests through peaceful means, participating in electoral 
politics remains larger than committing violence to reach political ends. 
Some of them succeed in gaining electoral victory to form governmen-
tal cabinets like the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) or 
taking part as coalitional partners in the current government like in 
Indonesia. This explicitly shows that Islamists are ready to moderate 
their ideological and political standing as long as their countries’ politi-
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cal spaces are widely available. In the same vein, other scholars point 
out that it is political contexts that eventually shape Islamist response 
to existing order and development (Bubalo, Fealy, and Mason 2008).
In Indonesia itself, adherents of political Islam have once again 
found their political space to maneuver freely in national affairs since 
democratization in 1998. After long decades under political restric-
tions from Suharto’s New Order, they finally transformed their move-
ments into a political party to reach their objectives through democratic 
and constitutional frameworks. The most significant political vehicle 
for Islamists in contemporary Indonesia that is widely known among 
analysts is the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). This party has got its 
socio-political inspiration from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as 
their ideological foundations to Islamize Indonesian society. Moreover, 
there are also other political parties with Islamic credentials: National 
Mandate Party (PAN), National Awakening Party (PKB), United De-
velopment Party (PPP), and Crescent Star Party (PBB). 
In the realm of electoral competitions, Islamic parties in Indonesia, 
just like nationalists, follow pragmatic lines rather than programmatic 
considerations in influencing voters’ political preferences. Even PKS has 
applied to catch-all parties as part of its political strategy in collecting 
voters’ supports from wider societal spectrums although it has solid and 
disciplined cadres acting as the party’s political machine (Tanuwidjaja 
2012). Nevertheless, the result for Islamic parties remains to show aver-
age outcomes. There are no Islamic parties that emerged as a single ma-
jority in Indonesian elections in the last two decades. They are mainly 
in the range of medium-sized party, except PBB, that is still unable to 
take over the nationalist party in terms of collecting major electoral 
support from voters. As the largest religion in Indonesia, Islam does not 
automatically provide Islamic parties with an electoral advantage over 
nationalists. A deeper analysis of the electoral competitions presents 
another fact that Islamic parties have limited segmentations in Muslim 
voters, who mostly are moderate (Abdulsalam 2018). Both nationalist 
and Islamic parties are in races to garner the largest electoral votes 
from the same constituency, Muslim voters. For its political existence, 
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Islamists have no other choices except negotiating their ideological 
stance with “power sharing-based pragmatic politics” (Hasan 2009a).
Classic classification of Indonesian Muslims into santri, priyayi, and 
abangan had also contributed another advantage toward nationalists 
wherein most Muslim voters are more associated with nationalists par-
ties due to cultural considerations rather than Islamic identity (Yumitro 
2013). Based on institutional establishments, nationalists are one step 
ahead of Islamic parties because they are supported by broader patron-
age networks and bigger financial funding. Moreover, political Islam in 
contemporary Indonesia is indeed represented by not only Islamic par-
ties but also “Islam-inclusive” and “secular-inclusive” parties (Baswedan 
2004). More importantly, nationalist parties have now repositioned their 
socio-political standings into more accommodative towards religious 
aspirations to deeply penetrate their stronghold in the Muslim elector-
ates and gain bigger electoral supports from Muslim voters (Tanuwidjaja 
2010). Consequently, space for Islamic parties to market their political 
agendas during elections has become more limited, ultimately bringing 
lower electoral supports for them than nationalist parties.
Another important story on Indonesian political parties is, at an 
ideological level; currently, there is no significant differentiation 
among them regarding socio-political and even economic views. The 
only thing splitting party ideology is religion, especially in terms of the 
roles of Islam in country’s political affairs (Aspinall et al. 2018). Here, 
it underlines the fact that Islam truthfully still holds great potential to 
be a critical determinant in driving Muslim’s political orientation in 
electoral competition. We have witnessed this reality since 2014, where 
Islam has arisen as a powerful tool for the electoral campaign and mass 
mobilization to reach political interests.
The emergence of populist figures like Jokowi and Prabowo since 
2014 has created a new phase of politicization of Islam. Through their 
populist rhetoric, both Jokowi and Prabowo have received extensive 
political support from Indonesian electorates. Prabowo is an example 
of a classic populist figure who tries to restructure of Indonesian demo-
cratic polity into neo-authoritarianism by condemning political decay 
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and corruption of Indonesian elites, while Jokowi is a new kind of tech-
nocratic populist who attempts to address government inability and 
ineffectiveness in delivering public policy for the development of the 
country (Mietzner 2015b, Case 2016).
However, in the Indonesian case, populism is supported by the po-
liticization of socio-religious cleavage by populist figures that make 
it growing up on a bigger scale (Mietzner 2020). This case has au-
tomatically affected voter’s acceptance toward populism that further 
suggested polarization among Indonesians into ideological cleavages, 
particularly Islamism and secular-nationalism (Fossati and Mietzner 
2019). Exploitations of populist issues from those figures have shifted 
the center of political battle from “democratic cosmopolitanism” to 
massive uses of “conservative brand of religious nationalism” (Bourchier 
2019). The 2014 election has been a starting point for “re-ideologized 
and repolarized Indonesian politics” with bigger potential conflicts be-
tween secularist-pluralist camps vis-á-vis Islamists (Mietzner 2015a). In 
this sense, Islamists seem trying to gain their political fortunes in the 
electoral battle into their favors by playing religious cards such as attack-
ing those who opposed Islamic credentials. The case of Ahok during 
the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2017 was proof of the blatant use 
of Islamic mobilization for electoral campaigns that finally beat him. 
Nevertheless, Ahok’s issue was only a beginning of a continuous politi-
cal mobilization based on religious lines that culminated in the 2019 
elections. After Ahok’s falls, Islamists, with FPI as the central part of 
Islamic mobilization, have appeared with stronger confidence to defeat 
their main political target—Jokowi, frequently stigmatized as too secular 
and an agent of foreign countries. 
Since the democratic transition in 1998, Islamic considerations have 
been playing their limited roles as the main driver for voters’ behavior. 
Explanations on voter behavior are mostly centered on the party’s lead-
ership and voter identification towards particular parties, it is the main 
determinant that drives voters’ political preferences (Liddle and Mujani 
2007, 2010). With the implementation of general elections, Indone-
sian voters in certain degrees have emerged as critical citizens giving 
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their electoral support based on rational considerations such as making 
evaluations on overall government performance (Mujani, Liddle, and 
Ambardi 2018). Education and per capita income are the two critical 
determinants for the existence of this new kind of voters with rational 
calculations (Mujani and Liddle 2015). In relation to Islam, an observer 
noted that Indonesian politics in post-Suharto has the characteristics 
of political de-alignment referring to the absence of heavily political 
conflicts among elites and masses in extreme ideological lines during 
Old Order in 1945–1955 (Ufen 2008). Even another author concluded 
that post-Suharto politics was the end period for political Islam due to 
the institutional weaknesses of Islamic parties and its unfavorable sup-
ports from most of the registered voters in general elections (Hamayotsu 
2011). 
However, the changing of the Indonesian political landscape in 2014 
has also shifted Indonesian voters’ behavior, particularly among Muslim 
constituents. Mietzner and Muhtadi (2018) point out that, since Jokowi 
took over presidential power in 2014, there has been a sharp increase 
in radical and intolerant attitudes among conservative Muslims feeling 
excluded from current policy-making, which caused a proper condition 
for Islamic mobilizations. Furthermore, both authors also emphasize 
that a higher degree of conservatism surprisingly emerges from middle-
class Muslims with higher education and income. At one point, this 
case has its impacts from the growth of Islamic pop culture that has 
consequently triggered large interests from urban middle-class Muslims 
on Islamic teachings. Since the democratic transition, we see the aug-
mentation of Islamic tendency among Indonesian Muslims to express 
their religious beliefs in diverse way ranging from Islamic fashion, halal 
products, sharia banking, Islamic websites preference as sources of in-
formation to actively engage in charitable work for Islamic foundations 
(Fealy and White 2008). 
Furthermore, this trend has been accelerated by the expansion of 
social media that Indonesian Muslims widely use. It has eventually 
made Islam not only “sets of rituals, beliefs, and doctrines but also 
a symbolic commodity relevant to social class demands for lifestyle, 
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modesty, and enjoyment accelerating the mushroom of Islamic pop 
culture” as a new form of piety (Hasan 2009b, 241–5). The rapid growth 
of television broadcasting and social media has also facilitated the emer-
gence of popular preachers to actively communicate with larger Muslim 
audients on religious discussions (Howell 2008). Therefore, figures of 
popular preachers ultimately emerge as new role models giving critical 
influence in shaping more religious piety among middle and upper-
class Muslims in contemporary Indonesia even though they still have 
a conservative tendency in their characteristics.
The increase of Islamic pop culture has given its greater influences 
towards the rise of religious devoutness and creates expectations for a 
bigger role in the social, economic and political fields among Indone-
sian Muslims. Vedi Hadiz (2014, 3–4) calls this trend as “new Islamic 
populism” in which its main agenda is “reorganizing power to ensure 
greater access and control over the state and tangible resources led 
by the righteous to facilitate markets that operate in ways favorable to 
the ummah” Unlike the Turkish pious bourgeoisie who provide socio-
economic bases for AKP to take control of the state, “the characteristics 
of Islamic populism in Indonesia are being shaped by the interests of 
those who find no place for themselves in the world of competition 
within markets or electoral politics” (Hadiz 2018, 6). Political exclusions 
and marginalization from current policies have significantly triggered 
grievances among conservative Muslims towards Jokowi’s government, 
with liberal secularists as his prominent supporters. It is the sense of 
grievance that is successfully exploited by “religious-political entrepre-
neurs” to take advantage of their political agendas by mobilizing the 
rise of religious sentiments among conservative Muslims against the 
existing order (Mietzner, Muhtadi, and Halida 2018).
The sharp rise of religious piety among urban and middle-class Mus-
lims in Indonesia has provided larger occasions for Islamists and other 
religiopolitical entrepreneurs to gain bigger supporters for their political 
agendas. The use of Islam as a political campaign has made it easier 
for them to penetrate and shape Muslim’s political perception. Survey 
findings from experts on ideological representation in contemporary 
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Indonesia exposed the fact that there is a close alignment or ideologi-
cal congruence between politicians and voters on the roles of Islam 
in political affairs (Fossati et al. 2020). Thus, it directly indicates that 
political Islam has surfaced as one of the principal forces structuring 
public attitudes and driving voters’ behavior where they tend to give 
their electoral supports following their religious lines (Fossati 2019). 
Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H1: Political Islam has significantly elevated Prabowo’s vote share in 
the 2019 presidential election in Pekanbaru and Kampar Regency. 
The presence of popular Islamic preachers who not only teach reli-
gious thought but also present socio-political issues in their dakwah 
(proselytizing) has added another influence in driving Muslim’s voting 
behavior. As we have pointed out in the introductory section above, 
preachers (ulama) are part of significant leverage whose voices would be 
certainly listened to by ordinary Muslims as the ummah. Nonetheless, 
the growth of conservative sentiments among Indonesian Muslims has 
placed ulama in the critical positions to guide their political preferences 
in accordance with religious lines. UAS, whom Indonesian Muslims 
widely know through his dakwah spread in social media, is no excep-
tion in this case. With a gentle approach and straightforward language 
in his dakwah, he has already gained a particular place in the heart of 
most Indonesian Muslims. Large Muslim masses attending his dakwah 
in various regions is straight evidence for his popularity and influence 
toward most Indonesian Muslims. Hence, we propose the hypotheses 
as follows:
H2: Ulama has a significant influence on the political preferences of 
ordinary Muslims to vote for Prabowo in the 2019 presidential election 
in Pekanbaru and Kampar Regency.
H3: UAS has weighty impacts on the significant increase of Prabowo’s 
vote share in the 2019 presidential election in Pekanbaru and Kampar 
Regency.
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METHODS
We applied a quantitative method to examine the influence of the fig-
ure of Abdul Somad and Islamic considerations towards voters’ political 
preferences in the 2019 election in Riau. We conducted a survey by 
distributing the questionnaire to 388 Muslim respondents. The samples 
were taken proportionally through clustered random sampling in the 
two most populous regions in Riau, Pekanbaru and Kampar Regency. 
The margin of error in our survey is 5%, and the confidence interval is 
95%. The primary consideration why our survey was focusing on these 
regions is that both are areas where there was a huge gap between 
votes for Prabowo and Jokowi. Our polls are a post-election survey con-
ducted in January 2020. We set three independent variables— political 
Islam preferences, perception towards ulama, and UAS Index —and 
analyze those explanatory variables with the pattern of electoral votes 
for Prabowo and Jokowi in the 2019 presidential election in Pekanbaru 
and Kampar Regency as the dependent variable. Since the dependent 
variable is binary dichotomous (“1” for voted for Prabowo and “0” for 
voted for Jokowi), we applied binary logistic regression to analyze the 
probability of respondents to vote for Prabowo or Jokowi. First, we ran 
reliability tests and conducted a factor analysis for items in each ex-
planatory/independent variable to determine the sampling adequacy 
of data and examine the natural factors generated from the variables. 
Afterward, we analyzed four models of binary logistic regression. The 
first three models are applied to each explanatory variable—political 
Islam preferences, perception towards ulama, and UAS Index—as one 
single model. The fourth model is applied for all explanatory variables 
as independent variables.
Table 1. Model of Analyses
No Independent Indicators/Items Dependent
1 Political Islam Preference Preferences on Political Islam
Voted for Prabowo 
in the 2019 
Presidential Election
2 Ulama’s Roles Perception towards Ulama’s Roles in Politics
3 UAS Index Engagement and Perceptions towards UAS
4 All Independent Variables All Independent & Control Variables
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To measure respondent’s views, we provided four answer choices for the 
main questions, that is, strongly disagree (score 1), disagree (score 2), 
agree (score 3), and strongly agree (score 4). We did not give an option 
for a “neutral answer” in our questionnaire because we would like to 
gain more assertive responses from respondents for each question we 
asked.
Building ‘Political Islam Preferences’ Index
Our first independent variable is ‘preferences on political Islam’. As 
demonstrated by many studies, the rise of religious conservatism in 
Indonesia has played a critical role in driving the political preference 
of Muslim voters in electoral competition. For this part, we gave re-
spondents questions on their main considerations in giving electoral 
support during the 2019 presidential election. Our questions consist of 
(1) considering and following Islamic teachings in voting presidential 
candidates; (2) choosing candidates who adhere to Islamic teachings; 
(3) electing candidates that have a strong commitment towards national 
values/culture and treating followers of all religions equally; (4) prefer-
ring candidates who supported by the ulama; (5) picking up candidates 
that support the implementation of Islamic law (sharia) as a foundation 
for the government and the state; (6) refusing candidates that have 
hostility toward Islam.
We developed an additive index of ‘political Islam preferences’ based 
on responses to align the six questions above. The Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient for the variables that make up the political Islam prefer-
ences index is 0.865, meaning that the variables have a high degree of 
internal consistency. This suggests that the items in the test are highly 
correlated. We also ran a factor analysis to examine the validity of politi-
cal Islam preferences items to test the construct validity of the political 
Islam preferences questions. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sam-
pling Adequacy for the factor analysis was meritorious (KMO = 0.877) 
and statistically significant (p = <.001). An initial analysis was run to 
obtain eigenvalues for each factor, and small coefficients (absolute value 
<0.4) were suppressed. The result shows component matrix value is 
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above 0.6 for each six-item. It suggests that each item of political Islam 
preferences variable is valid.
Perceptions towards Ulama’s Roles in Politics
As we mentioned above, ulama play an important role in educating 
Muslims on Islamic teachings. They are respected figures in Muslim 
society and even possess critical influence that can be converted into 
political gains. We asked our respondents to see their perception of the 
roles and positions of Islam and ulama in state affairs. The questions are 
(1) Islam is not only a religion but also a state, (2) Islam and politics are 
inseparable, (3) ulama should be respected, and their advice has to be 
listened to by Muslims, (4) the president with his government officials 
should listen to the inputs from ulama in managing state affairs, (5) the 
government should not discriminate against Islam, (6) the government 
should not attempt to criminalize ulama.
We developed an index of ‘perceptions towards ulama’s roles in poli-
tics’ (Ulama Index) based on the responses to align the six questions 
above. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the variables that make 
up the ulama index is 0.751, meaning that the variables have a high 
degree of internal consistency. This suggests that the items in the test 
are highly correlated. We also ran a factor analysis to examine the va-
lidity of ulama items to test the construct validity of the political Islam 
preferences questions. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy for the factor analysis was meritorious (KMO = 0.751) and 
statistically significant (p = <.001). An initial analysis was run to obtain 
eigenvalues for each factor, and small coefficients (absolute value <0.4) 
were suppressed. The result shows component matrix value is above 
0.581 for each six-item. It suggests that each item of the ulama variable 
is valid.
Measuring UAS’s Inf luence: Building UAS Index
UAS is widely known in Indonesia for his comments on Islamic 
thoughts in Indonesians’ daily lives, which are massively spread in so-
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cial media. He has expertise in Hadith and Fiqih (Islamic law). He 
was also a lecturer at the Sultan Syarif Kasim State Islamic University, 
Riau until 2019. What makes him famous among Indonesians is his 
sense of humor in presenting each Islamic lecture to the public. His 
personality represents the culture of marginalized, plain attire, frank in 
spoken; moreover, he also speaks in a thick-regional accent that makes 
his appearance is attached to ordinary people (Arafat 2019). Despite the 
pros and cons to his comments regarding several religious issues, he has 
emerged as one of the most influential clerics in present-day Indonesia 
(Sudrajat and Setyadi 2017). 
We arranged UAS Index to measure how respondents perceive the 
figure of UAS and to what extent it influenced voter’s political attitudes 
in the last presidential election. The Index is divided into two parts. 
The first section consists of simple questions to identify their familiarity 
and engagement toward UAS i.e. (1) do they know UAS, (2) have they 
ever directly attended UAS’s lectures, (3) do they actively follow UAS’s 
teachings in social media, and (4) how often in a week they listen to 
UAS’s teachings on Youtube. Second, we gave them main questions 
on the figure of UAS to see their perception of UAS—(1) UAS is a 
role model for Indonesian Muslims, (2) I like UAS’s Islamic lectures, 
(3) UAS’s lectures have given large bits of advice to Muslims inviting 
amar ma’ruf nahi munkar (commanding the good and forbidding the 
evil), and (4) UAS should actively be involved in government to prevent 
corruption and abuses of power.
We developed the ‘UAS index’ based on the responses to the eight 
questions related to UAS. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the 
variables that make up the UAS index is 0.831, meaning that the vari-
ables have a high degree of internal consistency. This suggests that the 
items in the test are highly correlated. We also ran a factor analysis 
to examine the validity of UAS items to test the construct validity of 
the perceptions and engagement towards UAS’s questions. The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy for the factor analysis was 
meritorious (KMO = 0.856) and statistically significant (p = <.001). An 
initial analysis was also run to obtain eigenvalues for each factor, and 
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small coefficients (absolute value <0.4) were suppressed. Two factors 
had eigenvalues above the Kaiser criterion of 1.0. Reliability analysis 
was then conducted on these two rotated component matrices, produc-
ing for the first factor, α = 0.637, and for the second factor, α = 0.858. 
Based on the factor analysis, we then called the first-factor ‘engagement 
to UAS’ and the second as ‘perceptions towards UAS.’ Yet, since the 
KMO and reliability analysis showed consistency and validity, we still 




Respondent characteristics are summarized in table 1. Most of our re-
spondents’ ages are 22–30 years old (37.11%), with 50.26% female and 
49.74% male. The majority of the respondents are Malay (48.97%). Most 
of them graduated from university (37.37%). Furthermore, housewives 
(17.01%) and farmers/breeders/fishers (22.42%) are the two largest re-
spondents’ occupations.
Table 2. Demographic Statistics of Respondents
Variables Category Percent











Education Elementary School 9.02
Junior High School 25.26
Senior High School 26.29
Diploma/Bachelor 37.37
Master 2.06










Income Subsidies from parents 6.96
< 1.000.000,- 21.39







In terms of income, 21.39% of the respondents make less than one 
million rupiah per month. 27.06% gets 1-2 million rupiah per month, 
38.14% earns two and half million till four million rupiah per month, 
5.41% receives five to seven million rupiah, and 0.52% obtains higher 
than ten million rupiah per month. 
Figure 1. Islamic Community or Organization that Respondents Follow/Participate
 
The next demographical characteristic or segmentation is the Islamic 
organizations that respondents follow. Most of our respondents follow 
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NU, comprising 38.1%. The second comes from Muhammadiyah, with 
24.7%. There are also 30.9% of respondents having no affiliation with 
any Islamic communities or organizations.
UAS, Islam, and Ulama’s Roles in Politics
UAS’s sense of humor covering his straightforward thoughts has been 
an effective way to get people’s hearts and attention. 99% of our respon-
dents know UAS, and 71.40% of them once attended his recitations/
teachings. 79.40% of the respondents were actively following UAS’s lec-
tures on Youtube and other social media. It shows that UAS has widely 
known not only in offline daily life but also in online platforms. As 
presented in the following figure, 34.8% of respondents listen to UAS’s 
lectures on Youtube 4–7 times a week, and 17% listen more than seven 
times a week. It means that most of the respondents spend their days 
listening to UAS, ‘no day without UAS’.
Figure 2. Interaction with UAS’s Lecture in Daily Life and Online Platforms
This intense interaction with UAS in offline and online platforms has 
shaped respondents’ views on their role model to be followed by Indo-
nesian Muslims, where 52.60% responses strongly agree and 38.10% 
agree (90.70%). As shown in figure 3, most respondents liked/loved 
the Islamic lectures of UAS (90.80%). His styles representing ordinary 
people have made Muslims feel attached to UAS for his lectures has 
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given much advice to people in doing amal ma’ruf and nahi munkar 
(commanding the good and forbidding the evil) where 92.80% gives 
agreements responses for this question (see figure 3). 
Figure 3. Perception toward UAS
57.70% strongly agree, and 24% agree (81.70%) that UAS should be 
actively involved in government activities to prevent corruption and the 
practices of abuses of power in Indonesia. With this firm agreement 
answer from respondents, it is understandable why there are contro-
versies on the figure of UAS in political affairs where some politicians 
tried to utilize his popularity for their political and electoral gains. So 
it is also reasonable if his support for Prabowo candidacy that he has 
declared publicly drove voting behaviors among Muslims in the 2019 
presidential election.
The major role of UAS was also congruent with how people perceive 
ulama or religious leaders in Muslim societies and its relations with 
Islam, the state, and how the state must treat ulama. As described in 
figure 4, 74.70% of respondents strongly agree, and 24.50% agree that 
the government must not treat Islam in such a discriminatory way. 57% 
of respondents strongly agree, and 40.70% agree (97.70% totals) that 
state or government leaders may not criminalize ulama. Otherwise, 
state leaders and government officials should listen to the inputs from 
ulama in managing the country (45.90% strongly agree, 42.30% agree). 
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Most of the respondents believe that ulama (ustadz and kyai) are figures 
who must be respected and listened to by Muslims.
Figure 4. Perception towards Ulama’s Role in Politics
Political Islam Preferences
The perceptions toward UAS, ulama, and the state based on the pre-
vious figures and explanations also have played a significant role in 
leading respondents’ perception of political Islam preferences. Fig-
ure 5 shows to what extent Islamic orders, values, and leaders have 
shaped respondents’ views and thoughts in determining their political 
preferences. 68.60% strongly agree, and 30.90% agree to consider and 
follow Islamic teachings and values in choosing the presidential and 
vice-presidential candidates. 67.30% and 28.40% also agree to vote for 
presidential and vice-presidential candidates who are obedient to the 
teachings of Islam. 67.50% and 22.90% of respondents agree to elect 
presidential and vice-presidential candidates supported by the ulama 
(ustadz and kyai). This is parallel with the next item, where 70.90% and 
22.40% agree to select candidates who support the implementation of 
Islamic law as a foundation for the state and government. Furthermore, 
almost all respondents (98.20%) did not prefer presidential and vice-
presidential candidates who were not accommodative toward Islamic 
teachings. 
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One of the most interesting findings in this study is almost all re-
spondents (99.50%) agree to choose the presidential and vice-presiden-
tial candidates who commit to preserve the values/culture of Indonesian 
people and treating all religions equally. It implicitly shows that al-
though the score on religious sentiment regarding political preferences 
is high, it does not make them possess a tendency to be intolerant.
Figure 5. Preferences on Political Islam
Theoretically, in figure 5, in terms of theological perspectives, Islam 
is an exclusive religion with its consideration of certain aspects of life. 
However, from sociological perspectives, Islam is an inclusive religion 
that demands the government or leaders to maintain the cultural val-
ues of its nation and give equal treatment toward all religious com-
munities.
Islam, Ulama, and UAS: The Strongest 
Determinant for Prabowo’s Vote Share
According to the previous explanations on the survey results, we run an 
index on the perception of Ulama, Islam, and the State items and an 
index on items of Interaction and Perception toward UAS. The indexing 
was to proceed with a correlation analysis with Political Islam Prefer-
ence variables. The following table presents the results.
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Table 3. Correlation between Preferences on Political Islam, Perception 
towards Ulama’s Role in Politics, and UAS Figure.
Pearson’s Correlations 
    Pearson’s r p 
Political Islam Preference - Ulama’s Roles 0.580 < .001 
Political Islam Preference - UAS Figure 0.684 < .001 
Ulama’s Roles - UAS Figure 0.653 < .001 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
We run three steps of correlation analysis. First, we analyze the percep-
tion and interaction from two variables—Ulama’s roles and UAS Fig-
ure—where the score was positively correlated, Pearson’s r(388)= .653, 
p<.001. This simply tells us that the higher Muslims’ perception and 
interaction with UAS, the higher their acceptance of the roles of Islam 
in contemporary Indonesian politics. Next, we conducted a correlation 
analysis between perception toward Ulama’s roles in politics and politi-
cal Islam preference. The result also suggests a positive and statistically 
significant correlation between both variables, Pearson’s r(388)= .580, 
p<.001. The last part is the analysis of UAS Index and Political Islam 
Preference showing a positive and statistically significant correlation 
between the variables, Pearson’s r(388)= .684, p<.001. The following 


























Figure 6. Correlation Matrix of Preferences on Political Islam, 
Perception towards Ulama’s Role in Politics, and UAS Figure
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Mujani, Liddle, and Ambardi (2018) point out that religious devoutness 
gives crucial incentives toward Muslim’s political orientation and par-
ticipation. The general trend that usually appeared is that the more reli-
gious a Muslim is, the more he/she follow religious thoughts as sources 
for political choices. Our survey data analysis found that Islam, Ulama, 
and UAS have a critical impact on voter’s political preferences in the 
last election. Here, Islam matters as a critical determinant for Muslim 
voter behavior. In the context of widespread use of religious identity 
during the electoral competition, it drives Muslims to consider religious 
thoughts more as a primary reference in giving their electoral supports 
towards parties and candidates. Our first hypothesis testing confirms 
that political Islam has significantly elevated Prabowo’s vote share in the 
2019 presidential election in Pekanbaru and Kampar Regency.
As scholars who understand Islam comprehensively and adequately, 
ulama have a duty to educate and encourage Muslims to follow Islamic 
teachings in their daily lives. Moreover, with their intellectual capacity 
in Islamic thoughts, ulama have the authority to issue legal opinions 
(fatwa) and clarify controversial issues in Muslim society. However, the 
roles of ulama in Muslim society are in not only religious aspects but 
also political issues since Islam perceives there is no distinction between 
religion and politics. In the last election, the active participation of ula-
ma (kyai and ustadz) has contributed towards shaping Muslims’ political 
narratives. Our finding confirms descriptive explanations on ulama’s 
places as primary references for Muslim voters during the election. Our 
statistical inference calculations prove the second hypothesis with more 
solid conclusions where all the computation is statistically significant 
where ulama influence political preferences of ordinary Muslims to 
vote for Prabowo in the 2019 presidential election in Pekanbaru and 
Kampar Regency.
As a popular preacher in Indonesia, UAS’s Islamic lectures cover not 
only religious thoughts. He also elaborates his lectures with contempo-
rary socio-political issues. Those who actively listen to his teachings/
recitations on social media or attend them directly would gain knowl-
edge on Islam and his perspective on current political development and 
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orientations. Consequently, he has not only attracted Muslims’ concerns 
on Islamic teachings but also influenced their political affairs. As a mat-
ter of fact, he also has a vast influence on Muslim political preferences 
in the last election. Our third hypothesis suggests UAS has weighty 
impacts on the significant increase of Prabowo’s vote share in the 2019 
presidential election in Pekanbaru and Kampar Regency.
Table 4. Binary Logistic Regression Analyses Results
Covariates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B Sig. Exp(B) B Sig. Exp(B) B Sig. Exp(B) B Sig. Exp(B)
Political Islam 




1.405 .000 4.074 .182 .721 1.200
UAS Index 1.654 .000 5.227 1.106 .020 3.023
Age -.654 .001 .520 -.581 .004 .559 -.645 .002 .525 -.700 .001 .497
Gender -.115 .761 .891 -.256 .483 .774 .285 .488 1.330 .307 .462 1.360
Education -.109 .560 .897 -.055 .766 .946 -.182 .332 .833 -.216 .258 .805
Income .223 .217 1.249 0.175 .309 1.192 .184 .290 1.202 .198 .269 1.219
Constant -1.208 .409 .299 -.652 .682 .521 .678 .591 1.970 -1.179 .492 .308
Cox & Snell R2 .088 .070 .097 .105
Nagelkerke R2 .159 .127 .176 .190
Note: Dependent Variables: Coded as “1” for Voted for Prabowo 
Subianto and “0” for Jokowi in 2019 Election
Based on the binary logistic regression analysis presented in table 4, the 
first three models are statistically significant. The three models—Po-
litical Islam Preference, Perception towards Ulama’s Roles in Politics, 
and UAS Index— have a positive and significant impact on Muslims’ 
probability to vote for Prabowo in the 2019 election along with the age 
variable. Yet when all explanatory variables are grouped in the single 
regression model, it is UAS Index (in Model 3 and 4) having the most 
significant impact towards the tendency for Muslim voters to elect 
Prabowo, still along with the age variable. The more active a Muslim 
follows UAS, the higher possibility he/she to choose Prabowo. Age fac-
tor was also significant to determine Prabowo’s vote share in Pekanbaru 
and Kampar Regency. Younger age group respondents tend to vote for 
Prabowo rather than Jokowi in the last 2019 Presidential Election in 
Pekanbaru and Kampar. This confirms our preliminary assumption that 
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a significant increase of Prabowo’s vote share in Pekanbaru and Kampar 
Regency was highly influenced by UAS. It means that in Pekanbaru and 
Kampar Regency “UAS Effect” was real in the last presidential election. 
Although there is a possibility for data generalization in the quantitative 
research, it is more appropriate for use in this study to conclude that the 
figure of UAS has mainly affected voters’ behavior in Pekanbaru and 
Kampar Regency during the 2019 presidential election. This implicitly 
means that we are unable at this moment to draw a general conclusion 
on the findings in Riau since our primary data in this study are mainly 
collected from Pekanbaru and Kampar Regency.
From our findings in this study, we can say that the major trend 
in the national politics during the 2019 election, with a deepening 
religious-political polarization, has profoundly shaped the pattern of 
voting behavior at the local level—Pekanbaru and Kampar Regency in 
this case. With the rise of Islam driving political and public discourse, 
political contestation in the 2019 presidential election has polarized 
Indonesian voters into religious line, particularly the division of Muslim 
community—Islamists and pluralists crafting a political alliance with a 
religious minority (Aspinall and Mietzner 2019; Nuraniyah 2020; War-
burton 2020a, 2020b). Although NU-affiliated respondents constitute 
the largest group in our study (see figure 1), Prabowo could instead 
get the dominant vote share in Riau Province, particularly Pekanbaru 
and Kampar Regency. An explanation for this case is because Malay 
composes an ethnic majority in Riau that is also the biggest group of 
respondents in our study. It is in line with previous studies suggesting 
that Jokowi’s electoral advantage would prevail effectively on the dis-
tricts/areas dominated by not only NU-affiliated voters but Javanese as 
well (Pepinsky 2019; Shofia and Pepinsky 2019). 
Nonetheless, deepening polarization among voters into socio-reli-
gious cleavages is not a good sign for Indonesian democracy since it 
can raise socio-political tensions and conflicts. Moreover, this sharp 
division tends to avoid constructive mechanisms to resolve governance 
problems due to highly zero-sum perceptions between opposing camps, 
which finally reduce public confidence toward democratic norms and 
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institutions (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018). In the most extreme 
case, political polarization can even lead to a democratic breakdown.
Our study also underlines the importance of sociological factors 
in directing voter behavior in Indonesia, especially religion. In the In-
donesian case, religion—especially Islam— has been acting as a criti-
cal source that encourages political participation and drives Muslims’ 
voting behavior (Mujani, Liddle, and Ambardi 2011, 2018; Pepinsky, 
Liddle, and Mujani 2018). This is understandable because demographi-
cally, Islam is practiced by the majority of the Indonesian population, 
and ideologically, it suggests that Islamic teachings consist of not only 
spiritual aspects but also socio-political realm. The roles of Islam as a 
Muslims’ political preferences have mattered more since the massive 
mobilization of Muslim communities in the Jakarta gubernatorial elec-
tion in 2017 against Ahok, who was suspected of religious blasphemy 
at that time. From this case, Mujani (2020) reveals that Islam has be-
come a more important consideration for Muslim’s political choices 
rather than rational and psychological aspects of voting behavior such 
as evaluations on government performance and party identification. 
Moreover, the 2019 presidential election has been the highest reach of 
Islamic politics that “structures public attitudes and voting behavior,” 
where it finally deepens political polarization into socio-religious cleav-
ages (Fossati 2019, 145). 
The critical influence of Islam in the last election thus has provided 
a political stage for preachers (ulama) to show their influence in direct-
ing Muslim’s voting behavior. In Indonesian politics, it has been such a 
usual condition where ulama are frequently approached by politicians 
during elections due to their ability to influence and mobilize electoral 
support from potential voters in favor of particular candidates. However, 
this trend explicitly exposes the weakness of party institutionalization 
in Indonesia, particularly in broad support at the grassroots. According 
to Indonesia Survey Institute (LSI), most Indonesian voters have low 
attachment or ideological affiliation toward a particular political party 
(Lembaga Survei Indonesia 2015). Political parties in Indonesia are 
generally entrapped into political personalization that relies on their 
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popular party figures who have ambitions to become president (Fionna 
2016, Ufen 2017, Tomsa 2018). That is why, when it turns to electoral 
competitions, a political party often depends on clientelistic and pa-
tronage networks or seeks political endorsement from public figures, 
ulama, in this case, to collect electoral support from registered voters. 
This trend also contributes to Indonesian electoral democracy as merely 
political competitions with losing and winning calculations rather than 
programmatic offers from political parties that will make Indonesian 
democracy more substantive. 
CONCLUSION
Since Indonesia has already chosen democracy as its political system 
to replace the authoritarian regime two decades ago, the 2019 election 
should be ideally a step forward to advance Indonesia’s democracy to a 
consolidated one. This is mainly because general elections, since 1999, 
should be able to support the importance of democratic principles as 
the only rule of political games acknowledged by political actors, stron-
ger party institutionalization, and the establishment of programmatic 
politics offered by political parties to voters. However, in the previous 
elections, religious identity, in this case, Islam, has become a critical 
determinant in driving voting behavior in Indonesian politics. The 2014 
presidential election has been the beginning of the exploitation of re-
ligious identity for political objectives. The 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial 
election solidified this political strategy with the fall of Ahok and the 
rise of Anies Baswedan. 
The political mobilization of Islamic identity culminated in the 
2019 election and caused intense polarization among Indonesians over 
political choices. Our study finds a significant influence of Islam toward 
voter behavior in giving their electoral votes in the last presidential 
election. It also emphasizes critical roles from a popular preacher—
UAS—in directing Muslims’ political preferences in the 2019 presiden-
tial election. Overall, the involvement of preachers (ulama) in the 2019 
presidential election has highly contributed to the significant votes for 
each candidate, Jokowi and Prabowo. In our study, the figure of UAS, 
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supporting Prabowo candidacy, emerged as a crucial factor towards the 
dominance of Prabowo’s electoral vote share in Pekanbaru and Kam-
par Regency in 2019. Thus, it makes sense that the figure of UAS is 
of significant influence toward political behavior of Muslim voters in 
Pekanbaru and Kampar Regency, where they follow UAS’s political 
orientations as sources of reference in deciding electoral choices.
The influence of Islamic identity toward the political behavior of 
Muslim voters provides bigger opportunities for those who try to reach 
their political objectives. What they need to do is simply exploiting vot-
er’s religious sentiments for their electoral benefits of other candidates. 
If this trend continues in the future electoral competition, it is not a 
good sign for Indonesian democracy as it is currently facing stagnation 
and even decline (Aspinall and Mietzner 2019; Aspinall, Mietzner, and 
Tomsa 2015; Power and Warburton 2020). Those having intentions to 
run for political positions in governments only need to rely mainly on 
their religious or ethnic identities rather than offer appealing and re-
alistic programs to the public. Voters do not have enough materials to 
judge politicians’ ideas, capacity, and capability to lead because public 
discourses during elections are largely dominated by religious senti-
ments. Consequently, the people will never get decent figures to lead 
governments and deliver prosperity to them. As long as this case exists, 
there will be no improvement in the quality of Indonesian democracy. 
Voters should also be more aware of electoral games and political logic 
in Indonesia to be able to make a rational judgment in casting their 
votes. This is because there are no friends or enemies in politics, and 
politicians always serve their interests.
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